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Introduction
In the Winter 2000 issue of the Yale Journal on Regulation, Thomas
M. Jorde, J. Gregory Sidak, and David J. Teece ("JST") commented on
some potential economic consequences of the Telecommunications Act of
1996 as implemented by the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC").' The article, published early in the implementation phase of the
Act, contained many general assertions about potential consequences, but
contained no empirical evidence. JST did, however, offer some interesting
and testable propositions. One of these addresses an important issue,
verification of which is rather straightforward: JST propose that mandatory
unbundling increases the "riskiness and cyclicality of the ILEC's
[Incumbent Local Exchange Carrier's] economic performance and, hence,
[impacts] on the ILEC's weighted-average cost of capital. Mandatory
unbundling raises both components of the weighted-average cost of capital
for ILECs-equity and debt.",2 The purpose of this brief Comment is to
perform that empirical test and to compare our empirical results with the
expectations of JST.
The Impact of Mandatory Unbundling: An Empirical Test
The goal of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was to "promote
competition" and "reduce regulation., 3 As part of this effort, the Act
required the ILECs to lease the elements of their networks-unbundled
elements-to their rivals at prices commensurate with costs. JST conclude
that mandatory unbundling will have adverse affects on the investment of
both the incumbent phone companies and prospective entrants. One of the
many alleged sources of these investment distortions is the effect of
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I Thomas M. Jorde, J. Gregory Sidak, & David J. Tecce, Innovation, Investnient. and
Unbundling, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (2000).. 2 Id. at 19. The 1996 Telecommunications Act requires the incumbent local exchange
carriers to lease capacity to other telecommunications firms at regulated prices equal to "cost." This
capacity-including, but not limited to, loop, switching, and transport facilities-is referred to as an
unbundled element. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified
in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
3 Id.
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mandatory unbundling on the ILECs' cost of capital. With regard to the
cost of equity, the authors indicate "[t]he cost of equity capital depends on
the systematic or 'beta' risk of the firm. . . . How does mandatory
unbundling affect an ILEC's beta and thus its cost of equity? The answer
depends on how unbundling affects the cyclicality of an ILEC's returns. 4
JST assert that mandatory unbundling increases the cyclicality of the
ILECs' returns, so beta should increase during an economic downturn.
During periods of "weak demand" (i.e., recession), according to JST,
Competitive Local Exchange Carriers ("CLECs") find it more difficult to
justify facilities deployment. During these periods CLECs are more likely
to lease unbundled elements than to construct their own facilities. Weak
demand for telecommunications services compounded with an increased
demand for unbundled elements, both of which reduce end-user prices and
thus profits, and the potential that the elements are priced below costs, all
"intensif[y] the cyclicality of an ILEC's returns."5
Assessment of the impact of a recession (or any event for that matter)
on a firm's beta coefficient is straightforward, and such analysis is
frequently employed. A firm's beta is estimated by:
Ri = ai + f8iR,,, + i()
where Ri is the stock return on firm i, R,, is the return on a broad market
index, ai is the intercept, Ai, is the beta for firm i, and ci is the econometric
disturbance term. Equation I is estimated by ordinary least squares
("OLS"), and typically employs daily, weekly, or monthly returns over
periods of various time intervals.
In the present context, it is not the firm beta that is of primary interest,
but the difference in beta between a period of economic expansion (/AE)
and economic recession (fl). A statistical test for the non-stationarity of
beta across time periods involves a slight modification to Equation 1:
Ri = ai + 3iR., + 7iD + 4iD. R,,, + ei (2)
where D is a dummy variable that equals I during the period of economic
recession (0 otherwise), y, measures the change in the intercept during the
recession, and, most importantly, A, measures the change in beta during
the recession period.6 From Equation 2, the expansion and recession betas
4 Jorde, Sidak & Teece, supra note I, at 19. Beta is the ratio of the covariance between an
individual stock's return and the market return to the variance of the market return. RICHARD A.
BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 173-78 (2000).
5 Jorde, Sidak & Teece, supra note 1, at 20.
6 See Phillip R. Daves et al., Estimating Systematic Risk: The Choice of Return Interval
and Estimation Period, 13 J. FIN. & STRAT. DECISIONS 7 (2000).
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can be computed, where f6 = A3i and ffr =i + Ai, The JST hypothesis is
that Ai > 0, so that the 8R > flE. The statistical significance of the estimated
coefficient Ai measures the statistical significance of the null hypothesis
that iR = ,E.
For obvious reasons, JST did not perform this statistical test of their
hypothesis regarding the cost of equity capital. As the authors observe,
"there has not been a recession since the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
[so] the conjecture about increased systematic risk is not falsifiable."7 At
the time of publication, the U.S. was in the midst of one of the longest
economic expansions in history. According to the National Bureau of
Economic Research, however, this economic expansion ended in March
2001 and the recession has continued until the present.8 Thus, this
empirical test of the JST hypothesis can be performed.
Equation 2 is estimated using weekly stock returns for the three Bell
Operating Companies ("BOCs")-BellSouth ("BLS"), Verizon ("VZ"),
and Southwestern Bell ("SBC")-and an index of the three companies
computed using a simple average of the three stock prices. 9 The market
index is measured by the S&P 500. Betas are computed using data for
three (224 observations) and five years (328 observations) preceding the
recession (March 2001), producing a total of eight regressions.' °
7 Jorde, Sidak & Teece, supra note 1, at 19.
8 BUS. CYCLE DATING COMM., NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, NBER's BUSINESS-
CYCLE DATING PROCEDURE, Feb 12, 2003, available at http://www.nber.org/cycles/recessions.htm.
Choosing the date an "event" actually begins to affect stock prices is perhaps the most difficult
component of empirical studies such as this one. It may be that the stock market reflected the
expectation of an economic downturn prior to its "official" recognition by economists. Empirical
evidence related to stock markets as leading economic indicators is mixed. See Douglas K. Pearce,
Stock Prices and the Economy, FED. RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY ECON. REV., November 1983, at
8-12; Joe Peek & Eric Rosengren, The Stock Market and Economic Activity, NEW ENGLAND ECON.
REV., May-June 1988, at 40-43. Pearce found evidence to support the proposition that the stock market
led economic downtums by two to four quarters. Pearce, supra. In alternate regressions, the six months
(two quarters) prior to March 2001 were excluded from the sample. The results were essentially the
same as those reported in Table 1, with the exception of higher t-statistics (and, thus, higher levels of
statistical significance) on A for both the "SBC" and "Index" variables. For the 5 year period, A is
statistically significant at the 5% level or better for "SBC" and "Index," and for the 3 year period A is
statistically significant at the 5% level (rather than the 10% level) for "SBC."
9 As is well known and documented by Amado Pciro, daily stock returns have both non-
normal and asymmetric distributions. Amado Peiro, Skewness in Individual Stocks at Different
Investment Horizons, 2 QUANTITATIVE FINAN. 139 (2002). These asymmetries and the serious
problems they cause (even in large samples) can be virtually eliminated by aggregating to weekly or
monthly data. See id. at 139 ("While some asymmetries are observed in daily returns, they disappear
almost completely in weekly and monthly returns."). Because of the shortness of the time series at
hand, weekly aggregation seems most appropriate. For further results on data frequency, see EUGENE
F. FAMA, FOUNDATIONS OF FINANCE 38 (1976) ("[The evidence] all lead[s] to the conclusion that
distributions of monthly returns are closer to normal than distributions of daily returns"); XUEZHENG
BAI, ET AL., BEYOND MERTON'S UTOPIA (I), (Univ. of Chi. Working Paper, 2002) (finding that "large
amounts of high frequency data do not necessarily translate into very precise estimates").
10 Based on weekly data, data for the recession period spans March 5, 2001 through June
17, 2002 (the latter being the last reported stock price for the date the data were collectcd). The three-
year betas were computed at the start date March 1998 (March 2, 1998 to June 17, 2002), and the five-
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Regression results and the estimated values of If and 91 are summarized
in Table 1. To improve efficiency of the estimates, the regressions are
estimated using generalized least squares."
Table 1. Regression Results
BOC Ci A r Ai R
2 
2
BLS (3 Year) 0.003 0.320 -0.005 -0.052 0.05 0.32 0.27
(0.85) (2.65)* (0.91) (0.25)
(5 Year) 0.003 0.482 -0.005 -0.215 0.08 0.48 0.27
(1.05) (4.89)* (0.97) (1.11)
VZ (3 Year) 0.002 0.547 -0.003 -0.143 0.11 0.55 0.40
(0.46) (4.57)* (0.46) (0.68)
(5 Year) 0.001 0.603 -0.003 -0.198 0.14 0.60 0.40
(0.58) (6.56)* (0.51) (1.10)
SBC (3 Year) 0.002 0.695 -0.006 -0.418 0.11 0.70 0.28
(0.57) (4.98)* (0.89) (1.71)**
(5 Year) 0.002 0.719 -0.006 -0.442 0.14 0.72 0.28
(0.61) (6.89)* (0.98) (2.16)*
Index (3 Year) 0.002 0.520 -0.005 -0.198 0.12 0.52 0.32
(0.61) (4.84)* (-0.84) (1.05)
(5 Year) 0.002 0.598 -0.004 -0.276 0.15 0.60 0.32
(0.75) (7.20)* (-0.93) (1.70)**
Note: t-statistics indicated parenthetically
* Statistically significant at the 5% level or better.
** Statistically significant at the 10% level or better.
All the estimated betas (fli) for the BOCs are less than 1.00 and
statistically significant. None of the constant terms (ai, v.) are statistically
different from zero. The estimated coefficient Ai is of primary interest. For
all three BOCs and an index of the companies, the estimated coefficient Ai
is negative. In no case is a positive value for A, observed. For three of the
eight regression models, the null hypothesis of an equal beta during
economic expansion and recession is rejected. For SBC (3 and 5 year) and
the index (5 year only), the recession beta is less than the expansion beta
(? < f). In no case is the JST hypothesis that fl' > fe accepted, and in
three cases it is rejected at the 10% significance level or better for an
year betas were computed with a start data of March 1996 (March 4, 1996 to June 17, 2002). The
recession period includes 67 observations (March 5, 1998 to June 17, 2002). Historical data are
provided at no charge by http://finance.yahoo.com.
II If the econometric disturbance terms do not have constant variance, then the standard
errors of the ordinary least squares regression will not be efficient (i.e., the standard errors are too large
and, consequently, the t-statistics are too small). Generalized least squares is a technique that improves
the efficiency of the estimated coefficients, but does not change the point estimate of the coefficient.
See ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINrELD, ECONOMETRIC MODELS AND ECONOMIC
FORECASTS 149-53 (3d ed. 1991). For all regressions, the null hypothesis of homoscedastic errors is
rejected using the White Test, see id. at 136.
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alternative hypothesis that fPR < ff. Consistently, it appears that, if
anything, the variability of the BOC stocks and, consequently, their cost of
equity capital has been lower during the recessionary time period.'
Conclusion
Using a standard model for risk measurement, and data for the BOCs
that includes periods of both expansion and recession, we find no evidence
that the variability and risk of BOC stocks increased during the recession.
Indeed, there is some evidence that the opposite might be the case. These
results are not consistent with the hypothesis that mandatory unbundling
increases the financial vulnerability of ILEC firms and their cost of equity
capital.
There are a number of explanations for these findings. While
unbundling may affect the profitability of the BOCs, this possibility does
not imply a change in the covariance of the BOC stock prices with the
market overall. Thus, unbundling may be bad for a BOC's economic
performance in some respects without affecting the firm's beta. Further, it
may be that the wholesale business for the BOCs, relative to their retail
business, is less, not more, cyclical because it shifts retail risks to
competitors. Other implications of the 1996 Telecommunications Act,
such as the opening of the interLATA long-distance market to the BOCs,
also may affect the cyclicality of the BOC stocks. Additionally, if JST are
correct that recessions reduce facilities deployment by competitors, then a
reduction in risk during a recession may be expected, since BOC profits
are higher when a retail customer remains as a wholesale customer without
abandoning the network altogether. 13 Finally, because beta is measured at
the corporate level, the effects of unbundling on risk are commingled with
the effects of other changes, and this commingling may mask the direct
effects of unbundling.
In the end, the question of how the provisions of the 1996
Telecommunications Act affect the riskiness and cyclicality of the BOCs'
economic performance has no unambiguous theoretical expectation. The
issue, therefore, is an empirical question. Empirical questions require
12 Not all estimating methodologies for the cost of equity capital employ beta. For example,
the dividend discount model computes the cost of equity capital as the dividend yield plus the expected
growth rate in earnings or dividends, BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 5, at 67-68. The cost of capital
also consists of retum on debt. While under review by the major bond rating firms, only Verizon's debt
ratings have not been downgraded (on Dec. 18, 2002), see Moody's Investor Serv., at
http://www.moodys.com.
13 See GEORGE S. FORD, A FOX IN THE HEN HOUSE: AN EVALUATION OF BELL COMPANY
PROPOSALS TO ELIMINATE THEIR MONOPOLY POSITION IN LOCAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKETS
7 (Phoenix Ctr. Policy Paper No. 15, 2002).
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empirical answers, and this paper provides one of no doubt many such
answers on this important policy issue.
